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MERCATUS
ON POLICY
HEDGE FUNDS AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
By Houman B. shadab T
he performance of hedge funds during the 
financial crisis suggests that wide-ranging 
financial regulation is not always necessary 
to advance investor protection and financial 
stability. While 2008 was a year of record 
hedge fund losses and investor withdrawals that came 
about in part because many hedge fund managers failed to 
 adequately respond to the financial crisis, the hedge fund 
industry significantly outperformed the heavily  regulated 
mutual fund sector and, unlike the banking industry, was 
never in jeopardy of collapsing. Hedge funds did not cause 
or meaningfully exacerbate the financial crisis and in fact 
have reduced its impact and are helping the economy 
to recover.
BackgRound
An investment fund is a collection of money gathered 
from investors for the purpose of having the money managed 
by an investment adviser. Hedge funds are a type of private 
investment fund. Typically, hedge funds function by making 
very frequent trades in stocks, bonds, and fi nancial deriva-
tives.1 Some, however, do make relatively long-term invest-
ments, even in assets other than fi nancial instruments (such 
as real estate and commodities). In an attempt to ensure that 
only fi nancially sophisticated parties invest in hedge funds, 
federal law does not permit hedge funds to raise capital 
through widespread advertising or solicitation and prohibits 
them from accepting funds from individuals having less than 
$200,000 in annual income or companies having less than 
$5,000,000 in assets.2 After suffering a trillion dollars in losses 
and investor withdrawals in 2008, at the start of 2009, hedge 
funds worldwide managed a total of $1.84 trillion in assets.3 
Although both mutual fund and hedge fund managers are 
compensated by charging a management fee based upon the 
size of the fund (typically 1 to 2 percent for hedge funds), 
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hedge fund managers also charge an annual performance-
based fee, typically 20 percent of profits and, unlike mutual 
fund managers, often invest their own money in the funds 
they manage.4 This compensation structure generally leads 
hedge funds to be more prudent in risk-taking than other 
financial companies.
Hedge Fund Regulation
Hedge funds are not subject to the full range of disclo-
sure requirements and limitations on investment activi-
ties that federal law imposes on publicly registered mutual 
funds. However, hedge funds are fully subject to federal pro-
hibitions on fraud, insider trading, and price manipulation. 
Hedge funds typically make substantial and timely disclosures 
to their investors,5 have the risks they take on monitored by 
creditors and counterparties,6 and are required by law to 
publicly disclose their large investments in public companies 
and certain short sale positions to federal regulators.7 Hedge 
funds also typically use third parties, such as prime brokers, 
custodians, and administrators that have direct access to the 
fund’s assets and are able  verify the fund’s actual investment 
returns.8 The hedge fund legal regime and associated busi-
ness practices provide substantial assurances against fraud 
and other forms of wrongdoing. The multibillion dollar Ponzi 
scheme fraud carried out by Bernard Madoff was made pos-
sible in part because Madoff did not manage a hedge fund and 
did not utilize independent services providers.
investment activities and Risk Reduction
In addition to buying stocks, bonds, and other financial 
instruments to be later sold at a higher price, hedge funds 
often engage in non-traditional investment strategies involv-
ing short selling and derivatives trading.9 Hedge funds can use 
a far wider array of investment strategies than mutual funds 
because hedge funds are not subject to the investment activity 
restrictions of the Investment Company Act.10
Hedge funds use short sales and derivatives to manage risk 
and reduce losses when the overall market is performing 
poorly. This practice is difficult for mutual funds because of 
the legal restrictions on their investment activities. In addi-
tion, hedge funds often borrow funds or use other forms of 
leverage to magnify gains. Using leverage, however, also has 
the potential to magnify losses. 
Although some hedge funds are highly leveraged, such funds 
are the exception rather than the rule. A 2007 study of hedge 
fund leverage by the Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) estimated that average hedge 
fund leverage was 3.9 to 1, which means that for every 3.9 dol-
lars in hedge fund assets, one dollar was equity and the rest 
was borrowed (or the economic equivalent of borrowing was 
achieved by using derivatives).11 By contrast, banking sector 
leverage generally ranges from about 12 to 1 to 17 to 1 while 
major U.S. investment bank leverage in particular ranged from 
20 to 1 to as high as 33 to 1 in recent years.12 
FiguRe 1: Hedge Funds veRsus u.s. stock maRket FRom 1990 to 2008
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lenders are generally sufficient to prevent hedge fund losses 
from disrupting the broader financial system. For example, 
most hedge funds limit their borrowings from the prime bro-
kerage divisions of banks far below what banks are willing 
to lend, which helps to ensure that banks are well protected 
against hedge fund losses.19 
In September 2006, the $6.6 billion hedge fund Amaranth 
Advisors set an industry record for the largest hedge fund 
collapse, yet its creditors and the broader financial system 
experienced no significant disruptions. Financial economists 
have even found that hedge fund losses have not spread to 
the general economy.20 The recent economic turmoil is a case 
in point. Widespread and sustained losses in the hedge fund 
industry did not begin until June of 2008, several months 
after the stock market began to experience persistent monthly 
 losses and a recession was already underway. 
conclusion
The legal regime applicable to hedge funds helps protect 
investors against market downturns by providing manag-
ers with the flexibility to adopt a wide range of investment 
strategies and incentives to strike a relatively healthy bal-
ance between risk taking and risk management. The out-
comes hedge funds produce for their investors on the whole 
and their lack of a direct role in the financial crisis indicate 
that there is no hedge fund market failure that demands addi-
tional government regulation. Indeed, additional regulation 
might hurt investors and the economy. For instance, restrict-
ing hedge funds’ ability to use leverage could increase eco-
nomic instability because certain investment strategies that 
reduce market fluctuations require substantial leverage to be 
effective.21
Moreover, additional government oversight may increase 
complacency, undermine ongoing private efforts to improve 
best practices, and overwhelm regulators with duties beyond 
their resources and abilities. In recent years, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) devoted unprecedented 
resources to enforcement with an aggressiveness among the 
highest of all securities regulators.22 Yet the Bernard Madoff 
scandal and the collapse of investment banks have shown that 
the SEC nonetheless failed to exercise appropriate oversight 
or adequately enforce existing laws. Creating an even more 
expansive system of securities regulation is therefore unlikely 
to increase the SEC’s overall effectiveness. Hedge funds, how-
ever, have already begun to respond to the financial crisis by 
improving risk-management practices.23 Regulatory reform 
for hedge funds should therefore focus on improving exist-
ing enforcement priorities and practices, not adding to the 
tasks that regulators are expected to perform. 
 By pursuing non-traditional investment strategies with the 
incentives created by their unique compensation structure, 
hedge funds have historically helped reduce their investors’ 
exposures to overall risks. Because hedge funds provide a 
cushion to their investors from overall market downturns, 
hedge funds help investors to diversify their portfolios and 
not keep all their eggs in one basket. Despite losing 18.3 per-
cent of their value in 2008,13 Figure 1 illustrates that even after 
fees hedge funds consistently outperformed the stock market 
when the market produced losses for investors.
tHe Role oF Hedge Funds in tHe Financial cRisis
Hedge funds did not cause the ongoing financial crisis. 
They are reducing the crisis’ overall impact and helping the 
economy to recover. 
The financial crisis stems from unsound business practices 
and poorly crafted regulation in the mortgage, banking, and 
credit markets. Hedge funds were not the primary investors 
in securities backed by mortgages and therefore did not create 
an excessive demand for banks to make risky mortgage loans.14 
Hedge funds did become significant players in the markets for 
buying and selling credit instruments,15 and academics and 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund have 
found that hedge funds’ involvement in credit markets made 
the markets more stable and efficient.16 
 
During the financial crisis, hedge funds have increasingly pur-
chased other companies’ poorly performing securities, including 
mortgage-backed securities, and made loans that help borrowers 
in otherwise tight credit conditions.17 By purchasing poorly per-
forming mortgage-backed securities, hedge funds are helping 
to keep asset prices from declining further, which may help 
to reduce taxpayers’ responsibilities for funding bailouts and 
economic stimulus measures. 
Hedge Funds and sYstemic Risk
Growth in the number and size of hedge funds and the 
increasing interconnectedness of global financial markets has 
raised concerns about “systemic risk”: the extent to which 
hedge funds pose a risk to the entire, or at least large por-
tions of, the financial system. The theory is that if one large 
or several smaller hedge funds experience losses, these losses 
may spread to other financial institutions and in turn severely 
undermine the stability of the financial system.
In practice, however, hedge funds likely would not pose a 
threat to the stability of financial markets. Hedge funds seem 
to become less prone to collapsing as their size grows, and 
when a hedge fund does shut down it is more likely to hap-
pen after a steady decline in returns than a sudden, surprising 
crash.18 Moreover, the risk-management practices of hedge 
funds, the parties that hedge funds trade with, and hedge fund 
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